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by Koji Takahashi
The shareholders of a company entrust the daily management of the company to a group of experts, namely directors. But as the owners of a company, 
shareholders maintain certain means of influence over the 
management of the company in order to protect the value of 
their shares and their right to receive dividends. Normally their 
influence is exercised through the expression of opinions and 
the casting of votes at shareholders' general meetings. However, 
there are other means of influence and one of them is the 
derivative action. It is an action against directors brought by a 
shareholder on behalf of the company. Where a company has 
incurred damage due to a breach of duty by a director, the 
company is entitled to take an action against the director, but is 
usually reluctant to do so. The derivative action enables 
shareholders to enforce directors' liability on behalf of the 
company. This article examines some aspects of its recent 
operation in Japan.
REFORM OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTION
In Japan the derivative action was relatively unused until 
recently.
The obvious disincentive for shareholders to bring a derivative 
action is meagre personal reward for winning the action, since 
any recovery awarded accrues to the company, not to the 
plaintiff-shareholder. The shareholder benefits only indirectly 
through the increase in dividend or in the value of his shares, 
which can be negligible.
One of the other disincentives, until recently, was expensive 
filing fees that a plaintiff might have to pay to initiate a derivative 
action. Until recently the filing fees were a certain proportion of 
the amount claimed from the directors. In derivative actions this 
amount can be enormous.
However, in the aftermath of a series of corporate scandals 
that came to light with the collapse of the bubble economy, steps 
were taken in 1993 to strengthen the shareholders' grip on 
management by making the derivative action more available. As 
one of the main features of the reform, the filing fees were set 
at 8,200 yen (approximately £40), regardless of the contested 
amount (art. 267(4) of the Commercial Code; art. 4(2) of the 
Civil Procedure Expenses Act).
EFFECT OF THE REFORM
The 1993 reform resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of derivative actions. The size of actions has also grown 
since the amount of filing fees no longer goes up with the 
amount claimed. Consequently, the derivative action has now 
become a potent deterrent to managerial misconduct.
On the flip side, concern is growing over abusive derivative 
actions. Corporate racketeers called sokaiya and other 
unscrupulous shareholders may use the derivative action to put 
pressure on directors with a view to extorting money or to 
resolving a personal dispute with the company in their favour. 
Regardless of the strength of their claim, the directors may find 
it cheaper to yield to their demand than to fight through the
action (see Amicus Curias, Issue 6, p. 7).
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE
A shareholder wishing to bring a derivative action must first 
demand that the company initiates an action against the 
directors and must allow the company 30 days to decide 
whether to accede to or reject the demand (art. 267(2) of the 
Commercial Code. art. 267(3) provides an exception where 
there is a risk that the company may suffer irrecoverable loss by 
the lapse of 30 days). Only a shareholder who owns a share 
continuously for the past six months may make this demand 
(art. 267(1) of the Commercial Code).
These requirements may be effective in curbing frivolous 
actions. However, thev will have a limited effect in deterring
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those shareholders who are determined to abuse the derivative 
action. A shareholder can bring a derivative action even if they 
bought a share after discovering an assailable director's conduct. 
All they have to do is wait six months after buying a share, make 
a demand and wait a further 30 days. The decision of the 
company not to bring an action, however well-reasoned, cannot 
stop the shareholder starting an action. (To avoid bias in favour 
of the targeted directors, it is not directors but auditors who are 
given power to decide whether the company should accede to 
the shareholder's demand: art. 275 4 of the Commercial 
Code.)
FAME
In one case, a derivitave action was brought in order that the plaintiff 
might become famous and thus able to claim higher tees as an 
attorney
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AS AN ABUSE OF 
RIGHT
The intended purpose of conferring on shareholders the right 
to pursue a derivative action is to obtain recovery of damages for 
the company. If a shareholder brings a derivative action for other 
purposes, e.g. to cause harm to the directors, it may be 
dismissed as an abuse of right (e.g. Nagasaki District Court, 19 
February 1991).
However, since a plaintiff-shareholder's personal gain from 
winning a derivative action can be minimal, it is not always 
possible to expect shareholders to bring a derivative action 
genuinely for the purpose of obtaining recovery for the 
company. If the claim is well founded, the action should not be 
dismissed too easily just because the plaintiff has an unintended 
purpose. Thus in one case, the plaintiff brought the derivative 
action in order to become famous, so that he would be able to 
claim higher fees as an attorney. The court denied the motion to 
dismiss the action on the ground of abuse of right. Instead, it 
proceeded to try the merits of his claim and eventually held in 
his favour (Tokyo High Court, 3 July 1989; affirmed by Supreme 
Court, 9 September 1993. See also Tokyo District Court, 18 31
April 1991; Tokyo District Court, 26 October 1995).
ORDER FOR THE PROVISION OF SECURITY
When a derivative action is initiated, on the fulfilment of 
certain requirements the court may order the plaintiff to 
provide security (art. 267(5) of the Commercial Code).
Dual purpose of the order
The primary purpose of orders for the provision of security is 
to secure the recovery of damages for a wrongful action. If a 
plaintiff loses a derivative action, he or she may have to pay 
damages to the defendant if the court determines that he or she 
knew or did not know in negligence that the claim lacked legalo o o
or factual grounds or the institution of the action was otherwise 
considerably improper. (For the requirements of a wrongful 
action in general, see Supreme Court, 26 January 1988; in the 
context of the derivative action, see Tokyo District Court, 25 
May 1990.)
The secondary purpose of orders for the provision of security 
is to deter abusive actions. Orders are often made to attain both 
purposes. The primary purpose alone cannot explain why the 
courts have often ordered a prohibitive amount of security, 
leaving the plaintiff with no choice but to give up the action. 
Since the courts have been displaying a strong tendency to grant 
motion for security, some commentators are warning that the 
availability of the derivative action may be unduly restricted by 
the increase in the costs of litigation, a result contrary to the 
intention of the 1993 reform to lower the filing fees.
Requirements for issuing the order
The court may order the provision of security upon prima 
facie showing by the defendant that the derivative action has 
been brought in 'bad faith' (art. 267(6) and 106(2) of the 
Commercial Code). The Japanese word for 'bad faith', akui, 
appears in various contexts of different statutes and assumes 
different meanings   from mere knowledge to malicious intento o
  depending on the context. In the context of ordering the 
provision of security in derivative actions, the previous cases, 
although not invariably, have found 'bad faith':
  where the plaintiff knows or does not know in negligence that1 o o
the claim lacks legal or factual grounds;
  where the plaintiff brings an action for a wrongful purpose.
(The leading case is Tokyo District Court, 22 July 1994.)
It is to be noted that the first of these two tests mirrors the
requirements for obtaining damages for a wrongful action. A
shareholder, in initiating a derivative action, is sometimes not
totally sure that the defendant-directors are liable, especially 
where the determination of their liability is subject to the 
business judgment rule. In such cases the plaintiff does not 
know that the claim lacks legal grounds. But the defendant may 
still be able to show by prima facie evidence that the plaintiff is 
negligent in not knowing that the claim lacks legal grounds.
Turning to the second test, this test suggests that even if theo ' oo
plaintiff's claim is legallv and factually well founded, an order for
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the provision of security may be made if the action is brought for 
a wrongful purpose. If the plaintiff's claim is well founded, the 
plaintiff will win the action and the question of damages for 
wrongful action will not arise. Justification for making an order 
in such cases would have to be sought from the secondary 
purpose of the order, i.e. curbing abusive actions. However, 
instances where an order was made solely on the basis of the 
second test are in fact rare. Typically, the second test has been 
employed to confirm the plaintiff's bad faith ascertained by the 
first test. Thus where a plaintiff brings a derivative action solely 
for the purpose of avenging on directors, often the claim is 
groundless and the plaintiff is aware of that (e.g. Nagoya High 
Court, 8 March 1995; Nagoya District Court, 22 September 
1995).
So far a clear definition of wrongful purpose has not emerged. 
It must be remembered that shareholders cannot always be 
expected to bring a derivative action genuinely for the purpose 
of obtaining recovery for the company. The courts in some cases 
suggested that ill-feeling towards directors alone did not
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constitute a wrongful purpose (e.g. Tokyo District Court, 22 July 
1994; Tokyo District Court, 21 February 1995).
A particular question arises where a shareholder brings a 
derivative action in pursuit of what they see as social or political 
justice. A claim may be framed in terms of accusing directors of 
causing loss to the company by allowing excessive expenditure 
to pursue their plan to build a nuclear power plant, a golf course 
or the like. The courts have not yet reached a consensus as to 
whether such motives constitute a wrongful purpose. While 
some courts held that pursuit of perceived social or political 
justice indicated a wrongful purpose (Nagoya District Court, 28 
February 1995; Gifu District Court, 16 January 1997; Osaka 
District Court, 28 August 1996   the case turned on different 
issues), one appeal court reversed such ruling but added that, if 
the plaintiff prosecuted their action in a manner driven solely by 
their social or political goal, the provision of security might be 
ordered in the course of proceedings (Nagoya High Court, 15 
November 1995; appeal from Nagoya District Court, 28 
February 1995). The answer to this question would depend on 
the extent to which companies are to be expected to assume 
social responsibilities. @
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